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Impact of wages and job levels on
worker absenteeism
Christian Pfeifer
Institute of Labour Economics, Leibniz University Hannover,
Hannover, Germany
Abstract
Purpose – This paper seeks to analyse to what extent absolute wage levels, relative wages compared
with colleagues, and the position in a firm’s hierarchy affect workers’ absenteeism behaviour.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper uses personnel data of a large German company from
January 1999 to December 2005. The data set contains 62,774 monthly observations of 1,187 full-time
white-collar workers. Probit and Tobit models for individual monthly absenteeism are estimated.
Findings – Absenteeism is negatively correlated with absolute wages, relative wages, and
hierarchical levels, which is in line with the paper’s hypotheses. Moreover, the results indicate that a
positive relative wage has a stronger impact than a negative relative wage, which gives rise to the
issue of unequal wage structures.
Research limitations/implications – The findings point to the relevance of interdependent
preferences and status in utility functions. From the non-linear relationship between relative wages
and absenteeism it follows that an unequal wage structure has the benefit that relatively better paid
workers are absent less frequenty, while the costs of higher absenteeism of workers at the lower tail of
the wage distribution are rather low.
Practical implications – The results show that not only the absolute wage level but also
status-related factors (e.g. relative wage, hierarchical level) affect employees’ work effort and that
unequal wage structures can be efficient to some degree.
Originality/value – The paper provides “real world” evidence from scarce personnel data for the
importance of interdependent preferences and status. Furthermore, the non-linear relationship
between relative wages and absenteeism is examined.
Keywords Absenteeism, Pay, Hierarchical organizations, Germany
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Previous studies of absenteeism have established a negative correlation between
wages and absenteeism as a proxy for work effort (for a literature review see Barmby
et al., 1991; Brown and Sessions, 1996). Studies using individual data like household
surveys analyse the impact of individual wages on workers’ absenteeism behaviour
(e.g. Allen, 1981a; Leigh, 1984; Drago and Wooden, 1992; Allen, 1996; Winkelmann,
1999; Barmby and Gesine, 2000), whereas studies using establishment data analyse the
impact of firms’ average wages on aggregated absenteeism in firms (e.g. Allen, 1981b;
Chaudhury and Ng, 1992; Barmby and Gesine, 2000; Heywood and Jirjahn, 2004; Ose,
2005). Both types of data sets are subject to measurement errors because information is
provided by workers or managers. Moreover, individual data sets largely neglect firm
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characteristics that interact with employee behaviour like absenteeism (Barmby et al.,
1991; Barmby and Gesine, 2000). Establishment data sets have the drawback that
variables are measured for the entire firm and, hence, cannot account for worker
heterogeneity. These problems can be mitigated by using personnel data of one firm,
because firm characteristics are hold constant and objectively measured absenteeism
for every worker is available. As such data sets are difficult to access, they are rarely
used. Barmby and Treble (1991), Brown (1994), and Barmby et al. (1995) analyse
personnel records of British manufacturing plants. Their results support a negative
correlation between wages and absenteeism.
In the subsequent analysis, I use personnel data of a large German company. One
advantage of the personnel data set is that it contains not only individual absolute
wages but also wages of co-workers, which allows the calculation of relative wages.
Moreover, it is possible to analyse the impact of a worker’s position in the firm’s
hierarchy on absenteeism behaviour. This issue has not been addressed in previous
studies on absenteeism. Experimental economics, however, has recently provided some
laboratory evidence on the effect of relative wage positions on work effort (e.g. Fehr
and Ga¨chter, 2000; Charness and Kuhn, 2007; Clark et al., 2006).
Main findings of my econometric analysis are that workers with higher absolute
and relative wages and at higher hierarchical levels are less absent, which points to the
importance of interdependent preferences and status in workers’ utility functions.
Furthermore, I find that positive relative wage positions have a larger effect than
negative relative wage positions, which gives rise to the issue of the efficiency of
unequal wage structures. The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents
theoretical considerations and research hypotheses. The data, variables, and methods
are described in section 3. Section 4 contains the econometric results. The paper
concludes with a short summary and discussion of the results.
2. Theory and hypotheses
2.1 Absolute wages
In the framework of the static neo-classical labour supply model, absenteeism can be
interpreted as a worker’s adjustment-to-equilibrium strategy (Allen, 1981a; Dunn and
Youngblood, 1986; Brown and Sessions, 1996). If a worker has signed an employment
contract with a larger than his utility maximizing number of working hours, he might
use absenteeism to decrease his working time to the utility maximizing equilibrium. As
long as the substitution effect dominates the income effect, a wage increase leads to a
larger number of utility maximizing working hours and, hence, to less absenteeism. A
higher wage can be interpreted as compensation for working more hours and for being
less absent. In Germany, workers who are absent due to sickness still receive their
daily pay (Barmby and Gesine, 2000) and firms can hardly verify the true health status
of absent workers[1]. Thus, a “greedy” worker has an incentive to enjoy absenteeism
and to pretend sickness as much as possible. However, workers might not be that
“greedy” and choose the initial utility maximizing level as reference point, even if they
receive wage replacements. In a dynamic context workers might also consider that
today’s absenteeism might negatively affect their future career advancement (e.g.
promotions).
Another explanation can be found in the gift-exchange model (Akerlof, 1982). If the
firm pays a high wage, workers might interpret the firm’s behaviour as a gift and react
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with positive reciprocity, i.e. they provide more work effort and are less absent.
Conversely, workers react with negative reciprocity and more absenteeism to low
wages (Dohmen et al., 2006). Non-shirking efficiency wage models (Shapiro and
Stiglitz, 1984; Barmby et al., 1994; Ose, 2005) also predict reduced absenteeism. In
contrast to the gift-exchange model, however, the worker gets no gift but is punished
(fired). Thus, the worker’s loss if caught shirking is positively correlated with his wage
level:
H1. Workers with a higher absolute wage are less absent.
2.2 Relative wages
In contrast with absolute wages, the impact of relative wages is largely related to
comparisons with co-workers. Happiness studies have found that satisfaction does not
only depend on one’s own income but also on relative income, i.e. on reference levels an
individual compares himself (Tomes, 1986; Easterlin, 1995; Clark and Oswald, 1996;
Watson et al., 1996; Solnick and Hemenway, 1998; Falk and Knell, 2004; Clark et al.
2007). Since job satisfaction is negatively correlated with absenteeism (Winkelmann,
1999), a higher relative wage is likely to be associated with less absenteeism.
Equity theory as a distributive justice principle concentrates on a fair proportion
between outcomes and inputs (Adams, 1965). From equity theory follows that a
worker, who feels overpaid or underpaid, will adjust his work effort (Akerlof and
Yellen, 1990). If a worker compares himself with a co-worker or a group of co-workers,
equity is reached in the equilibriums in (1), in which w denotes the wage and e the effort
of individuals i and j:
wi
ei
¼ wj
ej
, wi
wj
¼ ei
ej
ð1Þ
If the wage of worker i is higher than the wage of worker j, the effort of worker i should
also be larger so that the ratios between w and e of both workers are equal. Hence, a
relatively higher wage should be associated with relatively larger effort and,
consequently, with less absenteeism.
A higher relative wage can also be interpreted as a status symbol. Social status
theory suggests that the relative wage within a group is one determinant of the local
social status within this group. Frank (1984a, b) defines status as the relative wage
position of a worker in his firm. The nature of relative wages implies that “one person’s
gain in status can occur only at the expense of a loss in status for others” (Frank, 1984b,
p. 549). If status increases a worker’s job utility, it should reduce absenteeism for three
reasons. First, in the static labour supply model the utility maximizing number of
working hours does not anymore depend solely on the absolute wage, which is used for
consumption, but also on status in form of the relative wage position. For example a
lower absolute wage can be compensated by higher status. Second, the worker enjoys
his status primarily if he is at work. Third, if absenteeism is interpreted as shirking
and detected shirkers are fired by the firm, the worker could lose his status.
Accordingly, Clark et al. (2006) and Brown et al. (2008) report experimental and survey
evidence that wages of co-workers and the individual rank in the wage distribution
affect well-being and work effort:
H2. Workers with a higher relative wage than their co-workers are less absent.
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2.3 Hierarchical levels
In addition to considerable wage effects, higher hierarchical levels are associated with
higher status comprising features like autonomy, authority, responsibility, access to
centres of power, and titles, which are non-pecuniary elements of compensation (Frank,
1984b, p. 568). Contrary to relative wages, status in form of hierarchical levels does not
imply that a gain in status by one person is at the expense of a status loss for other
persons by the same amount. Consider an extreme example in which all workers are
supervisors and get the same wage. In such a scenario, a supervisor has no
subordinates and no status in a pure reciprocal relationship of hierarchical standing.
However, the formal position and title (e.g. supervisor or manager) might be visible to
outsiders and lead to higher external status.
After considering workers’ behaviour, firms’ behaviour in form of screening has to
be taken into account, too. A firm is likely to select and to promote workers with less
absenteeism to higher hierarchical positions because absenteeism is more costly at
higher levels (e.g. quasi-fixed employment costs, wages). Moreover, if a worker is
absent, the firm cannot learn about the workers’ productivity and, hence, the
probability to assign him to a higher level declines (Pfeifer, 2007)[2]:
H3. Workers at a higher hierarchical level are less absent.
3. Data, variables, and descriptive statistics
The data set was extracted from computerised personnel records of a large German
limited company that produces innovative products for the world market. The
company has a works council and is subject to an industry wide collective contract.
The personnel records contain information on all employees in the company’s
headquarter on a monthly basis from January 1999 to December 2005. The subsequent
empirical analyses focus on fulltime white-collar workers, who are the majority of the
firm’s workforce. Part-time employees (less than the regular 35 hours per week) are
excluded because they might have other reasons for being absent (e.g. family
responsibility, more than one part-time job) or have already adjusted the number of
contractual working hours to their optimal level. Moreover, part-time employment
allows a better balance of working and private life. The exclusion of blue-collar
workers is based on the consideration that medical reasons might play a more
important role for being absent in production work (e.g. injuries at work, lower degrees
of an injury or a disease already lead to an inability to work), which cannot be
attributed to shirking behaviour. Furthermore, apprentices, trainees, employees in
early retirement schemes, and employees who are absent on a permanent basis (e.g.
parental leave) are excluded from the sample. All in all, 62,774 monthly observations of
1,187 white-collar workers remain in an unbalanced panel.
The collective contract contains hierarchical levels that are defined using task
descriptions and qualifications needed to execute tasks on the job. Whereas new
entrants are largely assigned to hierarchical levels according to their formal education,
insiders can move up the hierarchy due to on-the job learning. The highest level (level
6) consists of non-pay-scale employees who are not subject to collective agreements
(“aussertariflich”) and can be associated with upper management positions. Table I
presents a further description of the hierarchical levels and descriptive statistics about
levels, wages, and absenteeism. Task complexity and autonomy as well as average
hourly wages are larger at higher levels. Hourly wages are computed by dividing each
IJM
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worker’s monthly gross income in Euros by his monthly working hours. Hourly wages
increase with levels and the wage quartiles show a sizeable within level variation of
wages. On average 13 percent of all white-collar workers in the sample are at least one
day absent during one month. Whereas the frequency is 18 percent among workers at
level one, it is only 8 percent at level six.
Probit and Tobit models are estimated to analyse workers’ probability (monthly days
absent larger than zero) and length (number of monthly days absent) of being absent
during a given month. As repeated observations per individual are not independent,
standard errors are clustered on panel ID. The variables of interest in the subsequent
analyses are absolute wages in Euros, relative wages[3] in percent (100 £ [individual
wage of worker i in month t/average wage at worker i ’s level in month t 2 1] ), dummies
for hierarchical levels, and dummies for wage quartiles at these levels. The formal
educational degree (high school, university, and less than high school as reference
group), a female dummy, age and tenure in years as well as their squared terms are used
as control variables. Since absenteeism seems largely affected by seasonal factors (e.g.
flu, vacations) and to control for aggregate factors (e.g. unemployment), month dummies
are included. Table II presents descriptive statistics of the variables.
4. Econometric results
The marginal effects on the predicted probability of being absent at the means of all
covariates are estimated using Probit models. The first specification in Table III
Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Monthly absenteeism (dummy) 0.1273 0.3333 0.0000 1.0000
Monthly days absent 0.4999 1.9230 0.0000 23.0000
Hourly wage in Euros 23.8600 7.0918 8.7356 83.3333
Squared hourly wage/100 6.1959 4.3644 0.7631 69.4445
Relative wage at level in percenta 0.0000 12.1329 255.1413 131.0405
Squared relative wage/100 0.4757 5.8436 230.4056 171.7160
Relative wage in percent (positive) 4.2675 8.9032 0.0000 131.0405
Squared relative wage (positive)/100 0.9739 5.6802 0.0000 171.7160
Relative wage in percent (negative) 24.2675 5.6220 255.1413 0.0000
Squared relative wage (negative)/100 20.4982 0.9556 230.4056 0.0000
Level 2 (dummy) 0.2132 0.4096 0.0000 1.0000
Level 3 (dummy) 0.2582 0.4376 0.0000 1.0000
Level 4 (dummy) 0.1541 0.3611 0.0000 1.0000
Level 5 (dummy) 0.1165 0.3209 0.0000 1.0000
Level 6 (dummy) 0.1694 0.3751 0.0000 1.0000
High school degree (dummy) 0.1476 0.3547 0.0000 1.0000
University degree (dummy) 0.3775 0.4848 0.0000 1.0000
Female (dummy) 0.2150 0.4108 0.0000 1.0000
Age in years 42.4135 9.6258 18.6603 65.9753
Age squared 1891.5580 819.6287 348.2058 4352.7460
Tenure in years 13.7323 9.6973 0.0055 48.2000
Tenure squared 282.6129 329.1557 0.0000 2323.2400
Notes: Number of observations is 62,774 for 84 months; Total number of white-collar workers in the
sample is 1,187; aRelative wages are calculated: relative wage ¼ 100 £ ((individual wage of worker i in
t/average wage at worker i’s level in (t 2 1)
Table II.
Descriptive statistics of
variables
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Table III.
Probit estimates
(marginal effects on
predicted probability of
being absent at means of
covariates)
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contains the absolute wage, its squared term, and the control variables (educational
degrees, gender, age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, and month)[4]. An increase
of the absolute hourly wage from the average wage (wM ¼ 23:86) by e1 decreases the
probability of monthly absenteeism on average by 0.47 percentage points[5]. Because
of the significant and positive squared wage effect, the total effect is diminishing. For
example, a e10 wage increase from the average wage does not decrease the probability
by 4.7 percentage points (10 £ (20.47)) but by only 3.95 percentage points.
Specification (2) includes only the hierarchical levels and control variables. The
marginal effects are significant and negative, i.e. workers not working at level one are
less likely to be absent. Except for level five, the effects are larger for the next higher
level. The strongest effect is estimated for level six. Workers at level six are on average
7.25 percentage points less likely to be absent compared to workers at level one. Since
the levels might also cover wage effects, specification (3) includes both. Whereas wages
and levels still have negative effects as expected, the separate effects are substantially
smaller and of lower significance than in the previous estimates. An hourly wage rise
of 1 (10) Euro has a marginal effect of minus 0.31 (minus 2.54) percentage points and
the marginal effect of level six is minus 3.55 percentage points. The results of
specifications (1), (2), and (3) support the view that absolute wages as well as
hierarchical levels reduce the probability of being absent. However, the results of
specification (3) might also be interpreted in a different way: workers with ceteris
paribus higher absolute wages than workers at the same level are less likely to be
absent. This interpretation already gives some hint for the negative impact of relative
wages, on which the focus relies in the next specifications.
The variable of interest in specification (4) is the worker’s relative wage at his level
measured as percent deviation from the level’s average wage. This measure of relative
wages is close to a normal distribution with a mean of zero. The effect of the relative
wage is significant and negative, whereas its squared term is positive but not
significant. A worker, who earns 1 (10) percent more than the average wage at his level,
is 0.09 (0.82) percentage points less likely to be absent. Since the size of the effects of a
positive and a negative deviation from the level’s average wage might differ,
specification (5) treats them separately. It can be seen that the effects of negative
relative wage positions are smaller and not even significant, while the effects of
positive relative wages are quite strong. For example, a deviation from the level’s
average wage by plus 1 (10) percent decreases the probability by 0.16 (1.46) percentage
points, whereas a deviation by minus 1 (10) percent increases the probability by only
0.06 (0.16) percentage points. Specification (6) includes wage quartiles at the levels to
validate the findings about relative wages. As can be seen, workers in a level’s second
or third wage quartile are not significantly less likely to be absent than workers in the
first quartile. However, workers in the fourth wage quartile are 1.79 percentage points
less likely to be absent compared to co-workers at the same level, who are in the first
wage quartile.
Table IV displays the results of the Tobit estimates which confirm the results of the
Probit estimates. For a quantitative interpretation, the marginal effects on the
predicted monthly number of days absent conditional on being absent at the means of
all covariates ((E(yjx,y . 0)/(x) are computed and presented in Table V[6]. The
marginal effects in Table V show that considering specification (1) an hourly wage
increase by 1 (10) Euro decreases the monthly number of days absent on average by
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Table IV.
Tobit estimates
(coefficients ¼ marginal
effects on latent variable)
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Table V.
Tobit estimates (marginal
effects on predicted days
absent conditional on
being absent at means of
covariates)
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0.03 (0.27) days. Specification (2) indicates that employees at higher levels are less
absent, except for level five. For example, employees at level six are on average 0.57
days less absent than workers at level one. In the combined estimate of wages and
levels in specification (3), both effects are smaller again. A wage increase by 1 (10) Euro
decreases the number of days absent by 0.02 (0.15) and the marginal effect of level six
is minus 0.32 days. Specification (4) shows that a relatively higher wage of 1 (10)
percent is associated with 0.005 (0.05) days less absenteeism. In the separated analysis
of positive and negative deviations from the average pay in specification (5), a positive
relative wage of 1 (10) percent decreases absenteeism by 0.01 (0.09) days. Negative
relative wages, however, have much smaller effects and are not significant. Moreover,
specification (6) shows again that only workers in the fourth wage quartile of a level
are significantly less absent, namely 0.10 days.
5. Conclusion
The econometric analysis of monthly absenteeism in a German company provides
evidence that workers are less absent if they enjoy a higher absolute wage, a higher
relative wage, and are employed at a higher hierarchical level. Overall, the results do not
only point to the importance of absolute compensation but also to the importance of status
related job characteristics like the relative wage position and the hierarchical level (e.g.
title, autonomy). An interesting finding is that a positive deviation from the level’s
average wage has a larger impact than a negative deviation which is not even significant.
One explanation for this finding might be that due to a self-enhancement motive
workers make downward comparisons in order to make themselves feel better (Falk
and Knell, 2004). Consequently, workers with a lower wage rank do not feel underpaid
and, hence, do not react with more absenteeism. A contrary effect, when choosing the
reference group, is the motive of self-improvement. This motive implies that workers
make upward comparisons and choose higher reference standards to improve their
own performance, which would also lead to less absenteeism or at least not to more
absenteeism. In addition to these psychological considerations, the non-negative
reciprocal behaviour might also be explained by an efficiency wage argument. Since
the analysed company pays wages above the union bargained wages, the outside
options of the company’s workforce might be worse so that workers have incentives
not to shirk and not to be absent even if they obtain a lower rank in the wage hierarchy.
Another status-related explanation follows the model of Frank (Frank, 1984a, b;
Schaubroek, 1996). Workers are not paid according to their marginal product because
they have different preferences concerning their relative wage positions. Workers at
the lower tail of the wage distribution are paid above their marginal product and
workers at the upper tail of the wage distribution are paid less than their marginal
product. The line of reasoning for this kind of wage structure is that workers at the
upper tail gain utility from their higher relative wage position, while workers at the
lower tail are compensated for their loss in status. Workers at the lower tail of the wage
distribution have lower preferences towards status because they could have moved to
another firm with a different wage structure, in which they are at the upper tail.
Therefore, they have no incentive to be more absent than workers at the upper tail.
Conversely, workers at the upper tail of the wage distribution might provide more
work effort because they could lose their status if they have to move to a different wage
structure.
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From the findings it follows that an unequal wage structure has the benefit that
relatively better paid workers are less absent, while the costs of higher absenteeism of
workers at the lower tail of the wage distribution are rather low. However, since the
returns to higher wages and, consequently, the gains from a steeper and more unequal
wage structure are diminishing, efficient wage inequality is limited[7].
Notes
1. This is partly due to the institutional arrangement that absence usually has to be medically
certified not until the fourth day.
2. Note that such selection effects might interfere with a causal status interpretation of
hierarchical levels.
3. An advantage of using ratios instead of absolute differences of wages is the following:
consider a collective agreed wage increase for every worker by 10 per cent. Such an increase
for everyone would also increase the absolute wage differences by 10 per cent even though
the relative wage positions have not changed at all. The ratios, however, stay constant. For
example, if worker i earned e10 before the wage increase, he earns e11 after the wage
increase. If the average wage at worker i’s level was e8, it is e8.80 after the wage increase.
The absolute differences are, therefore, e2 before and e2.20 after the wage increase, which
misleadingly implies a better relative wage position of worker i. In fact, the relative wage
position has not changed because everyone earns 10 per cent more. The ratios cover this
issue correctly because worker i earned 25 per cent (10/8) more than the average worker at
his level before the wage increase and still earns 25 per cent (11/8.80) more than his
co-workers after the wage increase.
4. Throughout all regressions, high school and university degrees have a negative effect on
absenteeism, whereas female and older workers as well as workers with longer tenure are
more likely to be absent. Since some month dummies are highly significant, aggregated and
seasonal factors play an important role. The complete regression results can be requested
from the author.
5. Note that the reported marginal effects are absolute values, i.e. they indicate the absolute
change in the probability. A quite small absolute marginal effect of 1 percentage point (0.01)
is a sizeable relative marginal effect of more than 8 per cent (0:01=0:12 ¼ 0:08).
6. For a discussion of marginal effects in the Tobit model see McDonald and Moffitt (1980).
Note that the probability of being uncensored was already estimated in the Probit models.
The marginal effects on the probability in the Tobit models have approximately the same
size as in the Probit models. Even though the reported absolute marginal effects conditional
on being uncensored are small at first glance, the relative marginal effects are quite sizeable.
For example, an absolute marginal effect of 0.4 days is a relative marginal effect of 10 per
cent (0:4=4:0 ¼ 0:1).
7. Freeman and Gelber (2006) find an inverse u-shaped relationship between output and
inequality in tournament experiments, which also indicates the limitation of wage inequality.
Furthermore, the wage structure in the model of Frank (1984a, b) cannot be steeper than the
wage structure if individual wages equal individual marginal productivity.
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